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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
   
No. 12-1685 
   
GREAT WESTERN MINING & MINERAL COMPANY 
v. 
ADR OPTIONS, INC.; BROWNSTEIN AND VITALE, P.C.; 
BROWNSTEIN, VITALE & WEISS, P.C. 
 
       Great Western Mining & Mineral Company and Benjamin C. Weiner,  
                                                             Appellants. 
     
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the  District of New Jersey 
District Court No.:  3-09-cv-02907 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
     
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 19, 2013 
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: August 8, 2013) 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 
 Plaintiff Great Western Mining & Mineral Company appeals the District Court’s 
order denying its motion to change venue and its motion for leave to amend and granting 
Defendants’ cross-motions for sanctions and Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
 The “tortured procedural history” of this case is well-known.  (J.A. 6.)  In 2002, 
Plaintiff
1
 and Brownstein and Vitale (“B&V”) agreed to arbitrate a legal malpractice 
claim that Plaintiff had asserted against B&V (the “Arbitration”).  Fox Rothschild, L.L.P. 
represented B&V; ADR Options, Inc. provided the arbitration services; and Thomas 
Rutter served as the arbitrator.  On the first day of the Arbitration, the parties executed a 
stipulation that stated that the parties, participating attorneys, and arbitrator had disclosed 
all conflicts of interest.  In 2003, Rutter ruled in favor of B&V.  Since then, Plaintiff has 
filed at least seven lawsuits protesting the validity of Rutter’s decision.   
The fifth of these actions is currently before us.  In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against 
B&V and ADR Options, alleging that they violated the stipulation by failing to disclose 
that (1) B&V had previously represented ADR Options; (2) Rutter had been consulted 
about hiring B&V; and (3) B&V had previously arbitrated disputes in front of Rutter.  
B&V moved to dismiss, contending that venue in New Jersey was improper and that the 
                                              
1
 Active Entertainment Inc. initiated the malpractice action against Brownstein and 
Vitale.  Great Western became the assignee of Active’s interest after the Arbitration.  In 
March 2011, Benjamin C. Weiner, the attorney for Great Western, became the assignee 
of Great Western.   
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case should have been brought in Pennsylvania or the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
The District Court agreed and dismissed the case.  Plaintiff appealed to this Court, and 
we remanded, reasoning that B&V had not satisfied its burden of showing improper 
venue.  We also noted that “[b]ased on the limited record before us, it appears that 
corporate Appellee Brownstein & Vitale has strong ties to the District of New Jersey. 
These contacts include: membership in the New Jersey State Bar, a substantial caseload 
in New Jersey courts, and an office in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.”  Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. ADR Options, Inc., 434 F. App’x 83, 87 n.3 (3d Cir. June 28, 2011).  After 
we remanded the case back to the District of New Jersey, Plaintiff filed a motion to 
change venue to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In response to Plaintiff’s motion, 
Defendants filed separate cross-motions for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  
Defendants also moved to dismiss the action.  While the motion to dismiss was pending, 
Plaintiff filed a motion to amend its complaint to add additional examples of when B&V 
represented ADR Options.       
The District Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to change venue and granted 
Defendants’ cross-motions for sanctions.  The District Court reasoned that Plaintiff 
presented no grounds for transferring the action other than the concerns that the District 
Court had expressed in holding that venue in New Jersey was improper.  The District 
Court noted that these concerns did not represent “changed circumstances” and that in 
any event, they had “little merit”, as this Court had vacated the District Court’s order 
dismissing this case for improper venue.  (J.A. 18.)  
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 The District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on preclusion grounds.  
First, the District Court held that Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting claims 
based on the alleged improper relationship between ADR Options and B&V because this 
Court had already considered those allegations in the third action that Plaintiff brought 
challenging the validity of the Arbitration.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 179 n.9 (3d Cir. 2010).  Second, the District Court held 
that even if Plaintiff was not collaterally estopped because it only asserted a section 1983 
claim in the third action, its claims were still barred under the doctrine of res judiciata, as 
Plaintiff could have asserted the claims that it asserts here in that action.  Third, the 
District Court held that this action is barred under the New Jersey entire controversy 
doctrine because Plaintiff should have asserted the claims he raises in this action in his 
fourth lawsuit, which he filed in New Jersey state court.   
The District Court denied Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend, reasoning that 
Plaintiff’s amended complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judiciata.  Plaintiff now 
appeals. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s imposition of sanctions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for abuse of discretion.  See Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the 
Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1996).  We review a district court’s 
application of res judicata de novo.  Elkdrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 
(3d Cir. 2009).    
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III. 
A. Sanctions 
 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing 
sanctions on Mr. Weiner for filing a motion to transfer this case from the District of New 
Jersey to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.   A court may impose sanctions under 
section 1927, if it concludes that an attorney, in bad faith, “unreasonably and 
vexatiously” multiplied the proceedings.  28 U.S.C. § 1927; Williams v. Giant Eagle 
Mkts., Inc., 883 F.2d 1184, 1991 (3d Cir. 1989).   
 Plaintiff contends that he filed the motion to transfer because he was “swayed” by 
the District Court’s opinion that venue in New Jersey was improper.  (Brief of Appellee 
at 66.)  The District Court’s analysis was no less applicable when Plaintiff filed his 
complaint in the District of New Jersey or when Defendants objected that venue in the 
District of New Jersey was improper.  Thus, if Plaintiff agreed that the “public and 
private factors”, id., favored the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, he should have filed 
this case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or re-filed it there when Defendants 
objected to venue in New Jersey.  Plaintiff instead chose to multiply the proceedings by 
appealing the District Court’s order that venue in New Jersey was improper to this Court, 
and then after prevailing, filing a motion to transfer venue.  Unfortunately, this strategy 
does not seem out of the ordinary for Plaintiff, who, in the past ten years, has filed at least 
seven lawsuits in four different courts, regarding an arbitration that was concluded in 
2003.  As such, we will not disturb the District Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff, in bad 
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faith, “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplied the proceedings, and, thus will affirm 
the District Court’s imposition of sanctions.    
B. Motion to Dismiss & Motion for Leave to Amend 
 We conclude that the District Court did not err in granting Defendants’ motions to 
dismiss and in denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend.  Res judicata is an 
affirmative defense.  In order to succeed on the defense, a defendant must show that there 
has been “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties 
or their privies; and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same causes of action.”  Sheridan 
v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  “Res judicata bars not only claims that were brought in the previous 
action, but also claims that could have been brought.”  Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
   The New Jersey entire controversy doctrine stands for the principle that “the 
adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court; 
accordingly all parties involved in a litigation should at the very least present in that 
proceeding all their claims and defenses that are related to the underlying controversy.”  
Rycoline Prods., Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).   The doctrine requires a plaintiff “to bring in one 
action all affirmative claims that [it] might have against another party, including 
counterclaims and cross-claims, and to join in that action all parties with a material 
interest in the controversy, or be forever barred from bringing a subsequent action 
involving the same underlying facts.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
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 We have reviewed the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable law, and 
will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the case and denying Plaintiff’s motion 
for leave to amend for the reasons stated in the District Court’s thorough and well-
reasoned opinion.  Although we will not repeat the District Court’s analysis here, we will 
repeat its admonishment of Plaintiff:    
Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel . . . must face the fact that ‘enough is enough.’      
They have plagued numerous courts with the same or similar allegations for more 
than a decade.  It is staggering to consider the resources expended by various 
parties, judges, and judicial venues that have all come to the same conclusion.   
Plaintiff and Mr. Weiner have to face the music and finally put an end to their 
unrelenting pursuit of Defendants related to an arbitration conducted years ago. 
 
(J.A. 32.)   
IV. 
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
